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TRADE ORGANIZATION
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1.

INTRODUCTION

On January 17, 1996, the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
handed down its first legal decision' since it began operations on
January 1, 1995.2 The case, which Brazil and Venezuela brought
against the United States, challenged regulations of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") setting higher Clean Air Act
emissions standards for imported gasoline than are applied to
similar, domestically produced fuels. 3 The WTO panel ruled that
the EPA regulations violated the prohibition of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") against domestic laws
4
that discriminate in favor of domestic products against imports.
* Professor of Legal Studies and Management, the Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania.
I See Paul Blustein, VVTO Ruling Draws Fierce Criticism, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,
1996, at F3; David E. Sanger, World Trade Group Orders U.S. to Alter Clean Air Act,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1996, at Dl, D6.
2 "Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring
full employment and a large and steady growing volume of real income and effective demand," over 125 states created the WTO on April 15, 1994. GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. The first day of WTO operation was January 1, 1995. See David
E. Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on China Exports, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1,
1995, at 14.
3 See Bhushan Bahree, WATO Panel Rules Against U.S. in Dispute Over Gasoline
Norms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at All. The Clean Air Act required U.S. producers to meet standards based on emissions of gasoline they produced in 1990. See
Sanger, supra note 1, at D6. Meanwhile, many foreign producers, who did not
have equivalent records documenting their 1990 production, were forced to comply with the average U.S. standard, which was a higher standard than some U.S.
refiners had to meet. See id.
4 See Sanger, supra note 1, at D6. Specifically, the EPA regulations at issue
violated the GATT "National Treatment" provision set forth in Article III. The
National Treatment provision states:
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Unlike a ruling of a U.S. court in such a sensitive, environmental case, the WTO opinion was not published or released so
that those interested could see and evaluate the panel's legal reasoning.5 Nor did interested environmental groups, American gasoline producers, or South American gasoline exporters have an opportunity to participate in-or even observe-the panel's
proceedings. 6 Under WTO procedures, the panel met, heard arguments, considered briefs from the states involved, and, with the
help of the WTO's legal office, wrote its decision. 7 All of this activity took place behind closed doors.
Assuming the United States loses its appeal of the decision, 8 the
only avenue by which the United States can avoid compliance under WTO rules will be to persuade every GATT signatory state,
including Brazil and Venezuela, to join the United States in voting
to overturn the decision. 9 The decision immediately drew "fierce

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. III, 61 Stat. A3, A18, 55 U.N.T.S 187, 206.
5 See Bahree, supra note 3, at All (noting the report was released only to the
countries that were parties to the case and would not be circulated to other WTO
member states until January 29, 1996).
6 For a discussion of the lack of participation by nongovernmental organizations in the WTO decisionmaking and policymaking processes, see G. Richard
Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World
Trade Organization,44 DUKE L.J. 829, 847 & n.85 (1995) (describing unsuccessful
efforts by the United States during the Uruguay Round negotiations to "reform
the existing closed nature of GATT panel proceedings").
7 See Bahree, supra note 3, at All. The process leading to the delivery of the
WTO panel opinion in the gasoline emissions case closely resembled the closed
opinion process that characterized the GATT dispute resolution mechanism. See
Shell, supra note 6, at 849 & n.93 (describing the role of the WTO Secretariat as assisting panels with the legal, historical, and procedural aspects of cases).
8 The U.S. Trade Representative stated that he will appeal the decision to the
WTO's new supreme court of trade, the WTO Appellate Body. See Steve Charnovitz, The WVTO Panel Decision On U.S. Clean Air Act Regulations, Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at 195 (March 6, 1996) (stating that the USTR announced its appeal
of the gasoline decision on Feb. 20, 1996). The right to an appeal of a WTO panel
decision is guaranteed by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act, supra note 2, Annex 2, art. 17, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1226, 1236 [hereinafter Understanding].
9 Unlike the GATT dispute settlement system, a WTO panel or appellate decision is adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (a group comprised of
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criticism" from Republican presidential candidates favoring economic nationalism, 10 public interest groups favoring environmental causes," and economists worried that the case might under12
mine support for the WTO in the United States
The gasoline import standards case illustrates several of the
problems that both Professor Philip Nichols and I foresee in the
new WTO dispute resolution machinery. While Nichols and I differ over the direction that reforms of the WTO system should take,
we agree that the WTO system, as now structured, is in danger of
13
collapse from political stresses.
In his well-crafted article, Professor Nichols articulates his disagreements with the WTO reforms I had previously proposed in an
article entitled Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization ("Trade Legalism"). 14 In Trade Legalism, I argue that the WTO should open its
dispute resolution system and policymaking bodies to outside
scrutiny and ultimately to formal participation by a variety of parties, including businesses and nongovernmental organizations
("NGO"s) 15
Nichols strongly disagrees with this idea and counters with his
own set of suggested reforms. For example, Nichols favors putting
representatives from all states that have signed the treaty in dispute) unless "the
winner of the case can be persuaded to vote to overturn its own victory." Shell,
supra note 6, at 849; Understanding, supra note 8, arts. 16-17, 33 I.L.M. at 1235-36.
10 See Blustein, supra note 1, at F3 (citing conservative candidate Patrick Buchanan's position that the United States should withdraw from the WTO and indicating his intention "to make this a major issue in this [1996 Presidential] campaign").
11 See id. (noting the opposition voiced by Public Citizen, the public interest
group founded by Ralph Nader).
12 See id. (discussing economists' concerns that the decision could provoke
vehement "protectionist and isolationist sentiment" against continued U.S. involvement in the WTO).
13 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties,17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 300-02 (1996) [hereinafter Nichols, Extension of Standing].
14 Shell, supra note 6.
15 See id. at 907-925. Similarly, Steve Charnovitz supports this opening of the
WTO policymaking and dispute resolution processes to NGOs. See Steve Charnovitz, Participationof Nongovernmental Organizationsin the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996). Indeed, Charnovitz has pointed out that
NGO participation in world trade governance has been an issue since before the
founding of the GATT. See Steve Charnovitz & John Wickham, Non-Governmental
Organizations and the Original International Trade Regime, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 111
(1995).
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nontrade experts on selected WTO dispute resolution panels as
"minority" members so that nontrade values will be given a voice
within this system. 16 Additionally, Nichols wants WTO dispute
resolution panelists to interpret the WNTO Charter to exempt from
WTO override any domestic law enacted "primarily" to codify
some nontrade "underlying societal value" even if such a law im17
pinges "incidentally" on international trade.
This essay summarizes my thesis, defends it, and discusses
why I think Nichols' reforms would turn the clock backward instead of forward on trade governance. Additionally, this essay explores the theoretical foundations for Nichols' proposals and demonstrates how these foundations both ground and unnecessarily
limit his perspectives on trade governance.
2.

BACKGROUND: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY, AND THE WTO

The occasion for my 1995 article and for this exchange of views
is the creation of the WTO. The WNTO legal system departs radically from its GATT predecessor in at least two striking respects.
First, a member state that lost a case before a GATT dispute settlement panel could simply block adoption of the panel decision by
the GATT membership and ignore it' 8 By contrast, WNTO legal
decisions can be overturned only if all states that have signed the
treaty in dispute, including the winner of the case, vote to reverse
them.19 In essence, the de facto veto power has shifted from the
states that lose cases to the states that win them. 20
Second, the GATT system did not provide a legal appeals process for the loser; it was either veto the decision, delay compliance
for as long as possible, or comply. Under the new WTO procedures, strict time limits for hearings, and compliance are now an

16

See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 328.

17 See id. at 297, 301; Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.

658, 709 (1996).
18 See Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 17, at 697. Since all GATT decisionmaking was by "consensus," one party could utilize a "dilatory" strategy,
block the adoption of a panel report, and bring the dispute resolution machinery
to a halt. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 155-203 (1993) (citing examples of
the dilatory strategy).
19 See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. at 1235.
20 See Shell, supra note 6, at 849.
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integral part of the process. 21 More striking, a new appeals process
has been established in the form of a permanent "supreme court"
for world trade -the WTO Appellate Body.22
23
The Appellate Body consists of seven appointed members
who, sitting as three-judge panels, will apply the "customary rules
24
of interpretation of public international law" in their decisions.
The Appellate Body has jurisdiction to hear appeals from all WTO
dispute resolution panels and make legal rulings on all treaties
supervised by the WTO.25 The creation of the Appellate Body and
the prospect of a growing corpus of carefully crafted legal opinions
that authoritatively interpret the WTO's main trade treaties gives
the WTO an air of formal legalism that was totally absent from the
GATT.26

In Trade Legalism, I attempt to explain these innovations with
reference to free trade and international relations theories. The
problem of international trade governance arises because the implementation of free trade theory and the related doctrine of
"comparative advantage" 27 call for levels of cooperation among na21

See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 17(5), 33 I.L.M. at 1236.

22 See id. art. 17(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1236; see also Shell, supra note 6, at 849-50 &

nn.93-98 (describing the composition and functions of the WTO Appellate Body).
23 The first seven members of the Appellate Body have now been named.
They consist of a former U.S. congressman and trade official, a career New Zealand diplomat, a German authority on international economic law, an Egyptian
economics professor and former World Bank official, a career trade diplomat from
Uruguay, a Supreme Court Justice from the Philippines with a graduate law degree from Yale who has extensive experience as a trade lawyer and international
arbitrator, and a Japanese international economic law professor who studied at
Tulane Law School as well as Tokyo University. See International Trade: WTO
reaches Accord on Membership to new Appellate Body, Picks Members, 1995 DAILY REP.
FOR EXECUIVES 230 d14, Nov. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Drexec
File.
24 See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
25 See id. art. 17(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The treaties supervised by the WTO are
set forth in Appendix 1 to the Understanding. See id. App. 1., 33 I.L.M. at 1244.
26 See Georg M. Berrisch, The Establishment of New Law Through Subsequent
Practice in GATT, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 500 (1991) (stating that the
WTO dispute resolution process creates "a system governed by the rule of law").
For a discussion on the shift from pragmatism to legalism in the GATI'/WTO system, see Jared R. Silverman, Comment, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Retaliation:Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 233, 253-63 (1996).
27 The doctrine of comparative advantage traces its roots to David Ricardo's
insight that nations are materially better off, individually as well as collectively, if
they produce only those goods and services that they are most efficient at producing and import the rest of what they need. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS:
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tion-states that are difficult to achieve and sustain in the face of
"realist" assumptions about state behavior. 28 As I summarize it,
the classic foreign relations theory of "realism:"
views states as the primary actors in world affairs and
treats all states as autonomous, self-interested, and animated by the single-minded pursuit of power. The interstate competition for power, in turn, creates a world that is
characterized by anarchy. In such an anarchic world, international law is "but a collection of evanescent maxims or a
'repository of legal rationalizations,"' and international co29
operative arrangements have an unstable existence.
From a realist perspective, international trade is problematic
because it requires states to lower economic and other protective
barriers, subjecting them to possible exploitation by power-seeking
rivals. 30
The structure of the old GATT dispute resolution system reflected the seeming paradox between the realist notion of selfinterested states and the idea of multilateral state cooperation to
lower trade barriers. The formally nonbinding GATT system assumed that a state would comply with international trade rules
only when that state deemed it in its immediate self-interest to do
SO. 31 To avoid the embarrassment of having states openly defy
GATT rulings, the system gave states that lost panel decisions the
de facto power to veto the panel decision. Consequently, throughout the entire GATT history, the GATT membership voted only
once to approve economic retaliation by one state against another
for violations of GATT treaty obligations. 32 With this highly flexiDECISIONS 357-58 (7th ed. 1992) (providing examples to differentiate comparative advantage from absolute advantage).
28 See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE 3-15 (1960) (discussing the six principles of political realism);
Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits Of Cooperation:A Realist Critique Of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism,42 INT'L ORG. 485, 485 (1988) (describing the fundamental tenets of realism and identifying its major proponents).
29 Shell, supra note 6, at 855 (footnote omitted).
30 See id. at 856-58 (describing the "paradox of Free Trade governance").
31 Conversely, if it was in a state's interest to comply with a GATT tribunal
ruling, compliance would presumably take place regardless of the fact that the
GATT system was formally nonbinding.
32 See Netherlands, Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS,
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ble and forgiving legal structure in the background, the GATT was
able to foster - or at least stay out of the way of - an unprecedented
expansion of trade and global economic integration during the pe33
riod between 1947 and 1995.
Against this background, the new WTO structure raises a serious problem for realist trade governance theory: how are we to explain and reconcile (1) the switch from formally nonbinding to formally binding rules and (2) the change from GATT's loosely
structured, arbitration-styled panel process to the current legalistic
system led by the WTO's Appellate Body? My article attempts to
help develop a theory to explain these developments by positing
three trade governance models -the Regime Management Model,
the Efficient Market Model, and the Trade Stakeholders Model. 34
The Regime Management Model best describes the current,
state-dominated structure of the WTO. The Regime Management
Model derives from "regime theory" 35 in the international organization literature of political science. Regime theory is an iteration
of realism that focuses on the fact that states usually cooperate
rather focusing on the potential that states may not cooperate. 36
Like realism, regime theory views the sovereign nation-state as the
primary actor on the world stage and accepts the state as the sole
voice for its people in international relations. 37 Unlike realism,
however, regime theory assumes that states are motivated to
achieve a set of sometimes conflicting goals, such as wealth enhancement and domestic political control, and not just the single
goal of power enhancement. 38 Regime theory views trade treaties
as "contracts" among sovereign states that help them to resolve po-

States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT BISD 1st Supp. 32 (1953); see also Pierre Pescatore,
Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
WTO/GATr DisPuTE SETTLEMENT pt. 2, at 8 n.7 (1995) (referring to the Netherlands Action initiated in response to U.S. restrictions on dairy imports).
33 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONIsM 8-9 (1988) (noting the probability

"that diminishing trade barriers were a major contributory force in the postwar
expansion of incomes").
34 See Shell, supranote 6, at 834-38.
35 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 217-19 (1993) (defining international regimes as "'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area"').
36 See Shell, supra note 6, at 858-66.
37 See id. at 835.
38 See id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:2

tentially conflicting interests over these diverse goals. 39 Binding,
rule-oriented trade adjudication can thus be seen as an enforcement mechanism by which states solve a multiparty "prisoners' dilemma" 40 arising out of their trade contracts.
Viewed as a formal international trade "regime," the new WTO
legal system has the purpose of providing states with a set of consistent, international legal rules. These rules are intended to induce states to negotiate trade relations "in the shadow of the law,"
rather than purely on the basis of power relationships. 41 Under the
Regime Management Model, both the potential gains to be had
from increased trade and the losses to be suffered by states failing
to faithfully abide by the trade adjudication system serve as sufficient inducements to assure compliance with the WTO, even
42
though international law lacks a centralized police power.
Against this quasi-realist explanation for the WTO, I posited an
alternative-the Efficient Market Model. 43 This model derives
from a combination of the foreign relations theory of "liberalism"
and an ideological commitment to neo-classical free trade doctrines. 44 Under liberalism, nations are neither conceived of as
autonomous, self-maximizing actors, nor are they considered the
ultimate actors on the international stage. 45 Rather, private individuals, businesses, and interest groups are the "essential players
in international society who, in seeking to promote their own interests, influence the national policies of States" in international relations. 46 Because free trade leads to the most (comparatively) efficient use of national resources, a majority of domestic economic
39
40

See id.
See id.

41 See id. When parties bargain "in the shadow of the law," they must take
into account not only their relative power positions and interests, but also their
predictions about how tribunals will interpret rules in particular cases. See, e.g.,
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) (discussing how legal rules confer
"bargaining endowments" upon the two bargaining sides in a divorce case, allowing them "to negotiate some outcome that makes both parties better off than they
would be if they simply accepted the result a court would impose").
42 See Shell, supra note 6, at 835.

43
44

45

See id. at 877-893.
See id. at 836.
See id.

46 Linda C. Reif, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the Improvement of International Environmental Law and Institutions, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 723, 737 (1994) (book
review) (describing Anm-Marie Slaughter Burley's definition of liberalism).
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interests and all transnational business enterprises are presumed to
favor implementing the doctrine of comparative advantage as an
international "rule of law." 47 Such a rule would constrain domestic
protectionists and legal rent-seekers that attempt to sidetrack governments from pursuing liberal trading policies. 48
Multinational corporations in particular gain from reduced
trade barriers because such barriers represent a deadweight loss on
intra firm movement of goods. Trade barriers between nationstates amount to nothing more than a tax on internal firm transfers
for large business entities whose production and distribution span
regional and global markets. In the United States, for example, intra firm sales from U.S. corporations to their foreign affiliates from
1982 through 1993 annually constituted a steady 30% of all U.S. exports. 49 Over the same period, from 32% to 37% of U.S. imports
derived from intra firm purchases, led by growing numbers of
purchases by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. 50
Because the domestic "losers" from international trade tend to
be well-organized, interest groups favoring free trade confront the
problem of how to systematically induce states to submit to the
greatest amount of free trade discipline. Viewed as an Efficient
Market Model institution, the WTO represents a partial triumph of
free trade interests over protectionist states, not a victory for states
seeking to maintain control over trade.5l With its binding rules
and authoritative Appellate Body, 52 the WTO legal system can potentially provide a strict set of international trade rules. These
rules can be used as legal instruments to strike down government
regulation of trade and achieve efficient international capital and
consumer markets. For example, the recent WTO gasoline import
standards decision 3 can be viewed as a legal triumph of international oil producers over their U.S. counterparts and allies in Con47 See Shell, supra note 6, at 836.
48 See Jan Tumlir, Need for an Open Multilateral Trading System, 6 WORLD ECON.
393, 406 (1983) (stating that "international [free trade] rules represent a truer expression of the national interest of all the countries concerned than the mass of
national (economic) legislation").
49 See Not by the Book, ECONOMIsT, Dec. 9, 1995, at 76 (citing OBIE WHICHARD &

JEFFREY

LOWE,

BUREAU

OF

ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS,

DISAGGREGATION OF THE US CURRENT AccouNT

AN

1982-93 (1995)).

See id.
51 See Shell, supra note 6, at 836.
52 See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 17, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
53 See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
50

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

OWNERSHIP-BASED

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:2

gress as readily as a strictly political adjustment in relations between the states of Brazil, Venezuela, and the United States.
From the perspectives of global capital and consumer markets,
the WTO promises to become the instrument by which beneficiaries of free trade (or their surrogates) can further reduce the legal transaction costs of global trade. The WTO's voting requirement that member states achieve complete unanimity to overturn a
WTO legal decision 4 is much stricter, in my view, than is required
to provide simple "regime management."5 5 Indeed, the idea that
all signatory states may be bound by a treaty interpretation that
only a single state (plus a dispute resolution tribunal) supports is
without precedent in international law. By setting such a high political bar to overturning a legal decision, WTO framers provided
states and free trade advocates with unambiguous, credible
"cover" against criticism whenever compliance with a WTO legal
decision promoting trade might run counter to any competing constituency's interest -whether that group is a locally protected industry, an international environmental group, or a labor rights organization. 56 With this leverage, the Efficient Market Model
hypothesizes that the internationally-minded business interests
that always monitored trade disputes as they wound their way
through the GATT will soon push the WTO to grant them some57
thing more than "shadow" status.
Both the Regime Management Model and -to an even greater
extent- the Efficient Market Model point to a WTO that will exalt
trade over other domestic and transnational values and thus, Nichols and I agree, place enormous domestic political stresses on the
WTO. But in Trade Legalism I suggest a third model, the Trade
Stakeholders Model, as an alternative vision of the interplay be54See Understanding, supra note 8, arts. 16(4), 17(14), 33 I.L.M. at 1235, 1237.
55 Until now, even the more radical international voting conventions required
three-fifths, three-fourths, or weighted majority votes to take action or make
amendments to treaty obligations. See David A. Wirth, Reexamining DecisionMaking Processes in International Environmental Law, 79 IowA L. REV. 769, 792-97
(1994) (discussing various examples of nonconsensus voting conventions as exceptions to the ordinary practice of requiring consensus to make any change or
adopt any new interpretation of a treaty).
56 Shell, supranote 6, at 900.
57 See id. at 902. Nichols confirms that business groups had favored access to
the GATT. See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 307 n.37 (discussing
how groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the World Bank
had access to GATr policymaking bodies). Nichols makes no mention of parallel
participation in the GATT by environmental, consumer, or labor rights groups.
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tween trade and other social policies. 58 This model is more visionary than either of the other two, and I concede in Trade Legalism
that "[s]ubstantial institutional reforms will be needed.., before
the Trade Stakeholders Model can be used as a blueprint for future
jurisprudential developments and systemic reforms within the
WTO." 59 Nevertheless, I argue that concerns about the WTO's
long-range stability, the distributive fairness of global wealth allocation, and the procedural justice of WTO processes all suggest the
normative superiority of the Trade Stakeholders Model over both
the Regime Management and the Efficient Market models.6 0
Like the Efficient Market Model, the Trade Stakeholders Model
sees individuals and groups - not states - as the primary actors in
international relations.61 Unlike the Efficient Market Model, however, the Trade Stakeholders Model emphasizes opening dispute
resolution and policymaking processes to environmental, labor,
and other groups. As a result, a wide array of interests can join
businesses and nation-states in the important task of constructing
the economic and social norms that will make global trade a
sustainable aspect of a larger transnational society. 62 In contrast
with the Efficient Market Model, which emphasizes "economic
legalism" in the WTO, the Trade Stakeholders Model embodies a
form of "participatory legalism" that would render the WTO an effective forum for discussing the trade-offs between trade and
63
nontrade issues.
The transformation of the European Union ("EU") from a cooperative steel and coal arrangement in the 1950s into the wideranging social and economic entity of today provides a useful
analogy. 64 Indeed, the EU and the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") embody Trade Stakeholders Model values that might inspire WNTO reforms, especially as continued global economic integration shapes international institutions and links trade with other
social values.
To summarize my three claims: (1) the Regime Management
Model best describes the present overall structure of the WTO; (2)
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

See Shell, supra note 6, at 907-25.
See id. at 838.
See id. at 907-08.
See id. at 911.
See id.
See id. at 915.
See id. at 917-19.
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the Efficient Market Model helps explain the most striking innovations in the WTO system, suggesting that globally oriented businesses will soon pressure states for more direct access to the WTO
machinery in future rounds of WTO reforms; and (3) the Trade
Stakeholders Model articulates an alternative to the Efficient Market Model as a blueprint for future reforms that is both normatively superior and more likely to result in long-run trade governance stability.
3.

A RESPONSE TO NICHOLS

Although Nichols characterizes his disagreement with me as
one involving the policy question of standing for NGOs in the
WTO dispute settlement proceedings, the differences between
Nichols' and my views can better be summarized as a difference in
theoretical approach. As an international relations "liberal," I look
toward the day when international institutions become more
transparent to the constituent domestic and transnational actors
that these international entities purport to serve. On the other
hand, I understand Nichols to be a trade "realist" who prefers to
leave trade matters under the control of diplomats and states.
Nichols acknowledges that "expanded standing [for NGOs in the
WTO] may become desirable" at some point in the future, 65 but he
clearly views this development with alarm.66 Because realists and
trade liberals philosophically disagree about the way international
relations should be conducted, it is no surprise that Nichols and I
disagree about opening up the WTO.
The realist underpinning of Nichols' world view emerges in a
number of ways. First, Nichols locates all "societal values"
squarely within nation-states and nowhere else.67 Transnational
values, such as global environmentalism and human rights, have
no place in his analysis except as these values achieve expression
either through domestic law or national policies of state "champions" for these concerns. 68 This focus on states as the sole legitimate
voices in international affairs is classically realist.
Second, Nichols sees institutions such as the GATT and the

See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 327.
See id. (stating that calls for expanding the scope of standing before WTO
dispute settlement panels "are suspect" and "should be heeded with caution").
67 See Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 17, at 668-90.
68 See id. at 676.
65
66
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WTO solely as "forums in which governments, not private parties,
formulate trade policy." 69 I agree with Nichols' factual assertion
that governments dominated the GATT structure and governments
created the WTO. But Nichols takes the fact of government domination a step further-he considers state-centeredness as "the essence" of the WTO. 70 An alternative arrangement for governing
global trade appears, to Nichols, not only unwise, but inconceivable because such arrangements are "based on implicit assumptions that do not comport with the real world." 71 The "real world"
of which he speaks, however, is simply the existing system of nation-states in which realists believe, not some truly objective reality.
In fact, global institutional arrangements show considerably
more complexity and flexibility than either Nichols or realist theory permits as possible. Even a casual review of international,
trade-related institutions reveals a number of international governance mechanisms in which states successfully share power with
private parties. For example, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") of the World Bank and
the International Labor Organization ("ILO") permit private parties to participate with states in settling disputes and making policy. 72 The ICSID permits private parties, mainly banks, to sue
states and obtain binding arbitration awards that the domestic
courts of the defendant states are obligated by treaty to enforce. 73
The ICSID is a global international adjudicatory system, not one restricted to European states or even to democracies. 74 The same
holds true for the world wide system of international commercial
75
arbitration.
Additionally, the European Union provides an alternative conception to the realist emphasis on dispute resolution and policymaking machinery monopolized by states. 76 Nichols acknowledges that analogies between the EU and the WTO are "inevitable"

69
70
71
72

See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 303.
See id.
Id.
See Shell, supra note 6, at 886-90.

73 See id. at 889-90.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 888-89.
76

See id. at 917-19.
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and even "useful," 77 but then quickly characterizes the EU as exceptional- and therefore of no relevance to the WTO-primarily

because the EU is composed of democratic states sharing a "commonality of values, experiences, and perspectives." 78
As the Efficient Market Model reveals, there may in fact be significant shared values regarding the promotion of free trade
underlying the WTO, but even assuming that no such common
values exist today, Nichols misconceives my point regarding the
EU. My point is to suggest the EU as a possible source of
inspiration for what the WTO can become given continued
integration of the global economy, not to describe what the WTO is
today. 79 In order to create the conditions necessary for a Trade
Stakeholders Model to take root, the WTO must have a chance to
evolve over a period of years - or perhaps even decades

-

in the

face of continued global economic integration. Simply put, the
WTO is today where the EU was forty years ago: a nascent
collective of trading partners attempting to frame the conditions of
rule-oriented economic integration.
My thesis is that domestic and transnational forces unleashed
by global trade and cooperation will shift the ground underneath
the WTO, advancing either the business-oriented Efficient Market
Model or the more broad-based, participatory Trade Stakeholders
Model. The history of the EU gives me hope that the outcome of
this dynamic process will have some of the attributes of a Trade
Stakeholders Model system -as the EU has today. 80 Nichols offers
an alternative, rather static vision of the dynamics of trade governance in which states-at least at the global level-continue to

dominate and control global economic forces. His proposals for
WTO reform seek to lead the WTO toward a return to the traditional realist assumptions that appear to have worked successfully

77 Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 322.

See id.
See Shell, supra note 6, at 838 (noting that "ultimately" all trade stakeholders should have "places at the table," but that "[s]ubstantial institutional reforms will be needed ... before the Trade Stakeholders Model can be used as a
blueprint for future jurisprudential developments and systemic reforms within
the WTO").
80 See Shell, supra note 6, at 917-19 (describing aspects of the EU institutional
arrangements that embody Trade Stakeholder Model values, including standing
for private parties in the ECJ and the transnational election of representatives to
the European Parliament).
78
79
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for the GATT.81
Differences of theoretical inclination aside, let us look for a
moment at Nichols' three substantive objections regarding NGO
participation in the WTO. First, he asserts that NGO participation
in the WTO undermines the authority of states to negotiate trade
policies. 82 The logic of Nichols' argument runs as follows: some
domestic NGOs might oppose their government's position on a
trade issue; such opposition would create an unseemly "spectacle"
as "irreconcilable dissonance" surfaced between the state and the
subject NGOs; "uncertainty about a country's true position" would
then ensue; and finally other states would become reluctant "to
83
negotiate with that country."
This argument gives trade bureaucrats too little credit. Is it
really so difficult to discern the differences among positions taken
by the United States government, the World Wildlife Federation, or
domestic trade associations? In the United States, the EU, and
even the United Nations, issues routinely pit governments against
governments and governments against interest groups.8 4 In these
81 The disagreement between Nichols and me on this point is, of course, one
of fact and cannot be readily resolved without a crystal ball. Nichols' realist perspective certainly has power in today's world and helps to explain such things as
the U.S. decision to bypass the WTO dispute resolution, instead using section 301
in its recent dispute with Japan over U.S. auto parts sales in Japan. See G. Richard
Shell, Kantor's "Sue Me" Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1995, at A27 (stating that
"[tihe United States is teaching the world to litigate American style in the new
W.T.O. legal system" by thinking of trade in terms of "contracts" and "damages"
and believing that the United States can gain more than it loses by breaching the
WTO strictures); Silverman, supra note 26, at 263-93 (describing the events surrounding the U.S.-Japanese auto and auto parts dispute and suggesting how the
WTO might resolve the conflict between multilateral and unilateral dispute resolution). It is also worth recalling that I identified the realism-based Regime Management Model as the best overall description of the way the WTO is presently
structured. Thus, our disagreement does not center on the way things are but
rather on the way they will and ought to be.
82 See Nichols, Extension of Standing,supra note 13, at 317-18.
83 Id.
84 For example, in a case now before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. government is suing the state of Virginia over Virginia's sponsorship of a public college that excludes women, the Virginia Military Institute. See United States v.
Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied 52 F.3d 90, cert. granted,116 S.Ct.
281 (1995). A variety of interest groups have weighed in on one side or the other
of this case. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1229-30 (listing the numerous
private associations who have attempted to influence the outcome of this case as
friends of the court). Nobody has expressed confusion over whether-nor implicitly suggested that-the National Organization for Women speaks for the Justice
Department or the VMI Alumni Association speaks for the state of Virginia.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:2

situations, parties do not become unduly confused about which
group, government, or entity stands on which side of the issue. Although the WTO has more members than any regional political or
constitutional union, trade bureaucrats are professionals who live
in an information age in which it is possible to stay informed about
political positions and interest group politics in various trading
states. Such information makes it possible to discern where a
state's position on a trade issue ends and an interest group's position begins. I see no substantial disincentive to trade negotiations
given this greater transparency.
Second, Nichols thinks the WTO is not up to the task of fairly
choosing which NGOs should-or should not-be heard. 85 Once
again, Nichols relies on an assumption of bureaucratic incompetence to support his view that states should have a monopoly on
trade policy and adjudication. Even if increased participation is
desirable, he argues, no nonstate voices should be heard because
WTO member states could never equitably decide which subset of
nonstate voices should be heard in any given matter. 86
This argument defies both domestic and international experience. The U.S. Supreme Court 87 and the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") 88 have developed rules to decide standing questions.
These rules may not be perfect, but they are sufficiently fair to satisfy most participants that decisions of standing are not sheer acts
of arbitrary political judgment. Similarly, the United Nations has
evolved an elaborate set of criteria for qualifying international
NGOs to participate in U.N. business. 89 Perhaps the U.N. standards could be used for international NGO participation in the
WTO. 90 Finally, this entire issue could be left to the community of
85

See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 318-19.

86 See id.
87 Before the United States Supreme Court, the normal rules of standing apply in cases where litigants advance their own interests, but special rules of standing apply when a litigant represents another's interests "to ensure that the controversy is indeed genuine and the interests of the individuals alleged to be
represented are indeed protected." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-54 (2d ed. 1988).
88 See K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 57-65, 122 (1984) (stating which persons may appear before the court
and the requirements that must be met in order to participate in a proceeding).
89 See Charnovitz & Wickham, supra note 15, at 111-16 (describing the U.N.
Charter provision that contemplates relationships with NGOs).
90 See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 337-40 (stating that the GATT Secre-
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NGOs themselves with some form of representative standing as
the goal. 91
Third, and most damaging, Nichols fears that NGO participation will weaken the ability of the WTO to pursue the goal of free
trade. 92 Nichols believes such participation will bring trade issues
into the "sunshine" of global publicity, amplify the voice of protectionist groups opposed to trade liberalization, and eliminate the
old GATT/new WTO "buffer" that insulates international trade
bureaucrats from domestic protectionist forces. 93 This is a serious
concern -one that goes to the heart of my critique of the WTO.
NGO participation by nonstate parties will certainly bring
publicity to global trade issues, and this sunshine will affect the
way trade bureaucrats make decisions. But domestic protectionist
groups will not be the sole, or even the main, beneficiaries of these
reforms. Rather, domestic business interests that favor free trade,
as well as international NGOs who champion global issues like the
environment, labor and human rights, consumer protection, and
product safety standardization, perhaps supported by domestic
counterparts, will be the big "winners" from my suggested reforms.
Protectionism is a battle most likely won at the domestic level,
where protectionists' pain is concentrated, and lost at the transnational level, where any given protectionist agenda balances against
the much greater gains realized by those who benefit from trade.
Thus, even as domestic politics requires certain exemptions or enhanced protection for politically vocal, import-competing industries, trade treaties tend to liberalize trade on a net basis rather
94 Trade adjudication then works incrementally to
than restrict it.
further implement trade liberalization. It is no coincidence that the
case in which the ECJ first recognized the standing of a private
party to bring a complaint against a government involved a Dutch
importer seeking to overturn his own government's protectionist
tariat prepared a report for the first ITO conference which contained proposed
procedures for NGO involvement in the ITO, the predecessor to the GATT).
91 See id. at 356.
92 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 319-21.
93 See id.
94 See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The Politics of Free-Trade
Agreements, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 667, 680-81 (1995) (modeling the politics of free
trade agreements in a way that demonstrate the need to provide both some measure of protection to or exemption for import-competing industries in order for
trade deals to be politically viable).
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custom duties on imports95 - not a protectionist group seeking relief from Dutch free trade policies. The same overall trend characterized GATT adjudications.
Environmental and similar global welfare perspectives, meanwhile, need be neither protectionist nor antiprotectionist. 96 Concerns for global warming, clean air, and chemical toxicity express
independent, valid transnational values that WTO treatymakers
and many domestic governments have chosen to minimize. 97 Because the general welfare of the earth's peoples may depend on
linking these values to trade policies at the international -and not
just the domestic governmental- level, such perspectives deserve a
multifaceted hearing within the WTO. Perhaps protectionists' interests will occasionally coincide with an environmental or consumer value, but potential coincidence is no reason for the wholesale rejection of all environmental, labor, or consumer voices.
It is precisely the technical "legalization" of global trade institutions that might possibly lead to their silent "capture" by the narrow set of business interests that are positioned to benefit most directly from indiscriminate global economic expansion. 98 The
Efficient Market Model seeks a global legal institution that can remove trade issues from the "noisy" realm of domestic politics and
place those trade issues into the rarified atmosphere of legal proceedings in Geneva, closed to all except a few states and business
parties most directly affected by the outcomes. 99
The Trade Stakeholders Model envisions an alternative that allows a broader array of private interests-not just business parties - to have a hand in both international trade policymaking and
adjudication. Normatively, I believe that broader participation by
nonstate parties, not monopolization by states, will give the WTO
the credibility it will need to make effective, legitimate pronouncements on trade and trade-related issues.
Nichols thinks that WTO's future depends on injecting nontrade values into the WTO while keeping the collision of trade and
95 See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Ondememing Van
Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
96 See Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and InternationalLaw, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 393 n.1 (1989) (noting that global climate change has been
recognized by governments as "a common concern of mankind").
97 See id. at 393 (noting that "states have generally proved unwilling to exercise their right of 'guardianship' over the global environment").
98 See Shell, supra note 6, at 881-85.

99 See id.
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nontrade trade issues as quiet as possible. 10 0 He proposes two
ideas to achieve this goal. First, Nichols proposes to put nontrade
experts on WTO panels. 01 This is an attractive idea that fits nicely
into the overall structure of the Trade Stakeholders Model and I
support it. But when viewed in light of Nichols' overall theory of
WTO panel practice, his proposal will do very little to alter the
GATT status quo. I therefore fear that putting nontrade experts on
panels without letting nonstate parties participate in panel proceedings would result in a change of "appearance" only without a
change in either the procedural or substantive justice of WTO decisionmaking.
Nichols asserts that WTO panels "are not courts and are not
meant to be courts." 10 2 He also sees the panelists in the WTO system as carrying on the pragmatic and "consciously circumspect"
traditions of the old GATT panels. 103 With nontrade experts safely
relegated to a minority role on such "circumspect" panels-and
without any nontrade experts at all on the all-important WTO Appellate Body-nothing need change about the results the panels
will reach. Nor would such a reform do much to broaden the base
of domestic and international political support for the WTO. To
achieve broadened support and confidence, the WTO will need to
let outsiders into the dispute resolution process so they can judge
whether the nontrade perspective is being expressed effectively
and considered seriously.
Second, Nichols proposes that when the Appellate Body is ultimately forced to grapple directly and legalistically with collisions
between trade and nontrade values, the Appellate Body should interpret the WTO Charter to exempt from WTO override any domestic law enacted "primarily" to codify some "underlying societal value" other than trade. 0 4 This proposal, which I previously
embraced as at least within the spirit of the Trade Stakeholders
Model, 105 is likely to return the WTO to the GATT status quo.
Exempting from WTO scrutiny a law that codifies an underly100See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 315 (stating that moving trade further into public view could "prove disastrous for free trade").
101 See id. at 328-29.
102 Id. at 326.
103 Id. at 325.
104 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 297, 301; Nichols, Trade
Without Values, supra note 17, at 709.
105 See Shell, supra note 6, at 921.
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ing societal value would encourage domestic protectionist groups
to meticulously draft domestic laws favoring domestic industries
to give these laws an appearance of being "primarily" directed at a
legitimate "underlying societal value." Careful drafting of domestic laws could easily become the old GATT "veto" power in disguise, because there is no reliable way for a member of the WTO
Appellate Body to pierce the surface of domestic laws and discover
their "true" purpose. Nor does Nichols offer a persuasive, principled method of analysis whereby the Appellate Body could distinguish which societal values are "legitimate" and which domestic
laws having protectionist effects might be deemed exempt from
WTO review because they are "primarily" directed at those "legitimate" values. In short, this idea would give protectionism a
new tool to avoid the liberal trade regime just when the system of
trading states had figured out a way to use an international
mechanism to trump these forces. 106
4.

CONCLUSIONS

To summarize our differences, Nichols writes that countries
asked to choose between "obedience to the World Trade Organization and having empirically legitimate [domestic] laws" will

106 One way to get a taste for these interpretive difficulties is to observe the
clashes that occur when U.S. courts attempt to discern whether government actions that have racially discriminatory effects can be overturned based on a finding of discriminatory "intent." In City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981),
for example, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine if a city had acted
lawfully in agreeing, at the request of a white neighborhood, to place a road barrier between that neighborhood and an immediately adjoining black neighborhood so that traffic would not flow between the two areas. The issue was whether
the city acted with discriminatory intent or for reasons related to neighborhood
safety and orderliness. After a full trial in which various neighborhood residents
and city officials gave testimony as to their states of mind, the district court held
that the city acted from a proper motive. See id. at 108. The appeals court reviewed the same evidence and held that the city had an improper motive. See id.
at 109. The Supreme Court took at look at the same evidence a third time and,
over a dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan, see id. at 135, held that the city
acted lawfully. See id. at 110-29. In short, the motives of the city residents and officials were difficult to parse and different judges drew different inferences from
the evidence. Professor Nichols' proposal to charge international jurists with
judging the motives of various national legislatures as "legitimate" or "protectionist" without any mechanism for taking primary evidence on motive as a question
of fact makes the City of Memphis case look easy. Just like the road barriers in the
City of Memphis case, the trade barriers of international relations have very complex origins that cannot be parsed by simply reading the laws that create them.
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choose the latter. 10 7 As a realist, Nichols is convinced that states
will thus fatally undermine the WTO. His solution is to see that
states can avoid this choice. Meanwhile, to assuage international
environmental and interest groups with nontrade agendas, he proposes to place nontrade experts in minority positions on WTO
panels but not on the Appellate Body, which has the final word on
WTO law. Nichols is worried that the WTO's current structure
may be too rigid to withstand the political winds of domestic politics, but he thinks that my proposals will push trade even more
into the political "spotlight," making the WTO's situation worse.
As a foreign relations liberal, I have more confidence that the
domestic and transnational political conditions under which the
WTO operates can change and, furthermore, that the forces of
global economic integration will eventually push the WTO toward
more transparency, especially with respect to the business interests
that are directly effected by domestic trade policies. In this altered
world, the WTO must accommodate a broader set of trade stakeholders if the it is to command sufficiently broad support to
achieve compliance with its legal decisions.
Unlike Nichols, I think that the "quiet" days of trade adjudication and policymaking are gone. His attempts to preserve trade in
a zone of secrecy will only hurt our common cause of creating a
robust system for resolving international trade disputes. Reports
on global economic integration and competition are the stuff of
everyday news,108 and trade policymaking will (and should) never
again be the special province of the foreign policy and trade elites.
The question for today is not how to put a lid on publicity regarding trade differences, it is how best to assure that points of view
about transnational issues such as the environment, consumer issues, and labor standards -issues that no single state may have a
sufficient incentive to champion consistently -are heard in the in-

Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 300.
108 The 1996 Republican Presidential primaries suggest that I am correct as
trade has developed into a substantial campaign issue even though Republicans
are traditionally a party favoring liberal trade. See Richard L. Berke, Candidates
Clash Over Trade Issues Heading Into Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al (quoting
Bob Dole as not realizing "that jobs and trade... would become a big issue in the
last few days of this [primary] campaign"); David E. Sanger, A Flare-Upof Passions
Over Global Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al (reporting that Patrick Buchanan's campaign for President has "gathered steam and passionate crowds with
his thundering calls for economic nationalism").
107

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

724

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:2

ternational trade institutions that will increasingly have the power
to shape our future.
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